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Moberly: Perception or Reality?: Some Reflections on the Interpretation of

PERCEPTION OR REALITY?: SOME
REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
Michael D. Moberly*

It is of little solace to a person denied employment to know that the
employer's view of his or her condition is erroneous. To such a
person, the perception of the employer is as important as reality.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Discrimination against persons with disabilities2 has been characterized as "an evil on a par with racial, sexual, and ethnic discrimination."'
Recognition of that fact has recently resulted in significant expansions to
the legal protections available to such persons.4 The most visible and
* B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix,
Arizona; Vice Chairman, Arizona Agricultural Employment Relations Board; Editor, The Arizona
Labor Letter.
The author filed an amicus brief in support of the employer's position in Burris v. City of
Phoenix, one of the cases discussed in this article. He is grateful to Professor Barbara Hoffman of
the Seton Hall University School of Law, who submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the National
Coalition for Cancer Survivorship in support of the plaintiff's position in Burris, for graciously
reviewing and commenting upon an article with which she is not altogether in agreement.
1. E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (D. Haw. 1980).
2. Disability rights advocates appear to prefer the term "persons with disabilities" to such
potential alternatives as "disabled persons" or "the disabled." See Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment,
Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of FederalLegislation and Social
Policyfor People with Disabilities,40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1342 n.2 (1993).
3. Allen v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 64, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F.
Supp. 282, 294-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that "[t]he history of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities, while less noted than racial or sex discrimination, is no less a story of a group that
has traditionally suffered... the badge of inferiority emplaced by a society that often shuns their
presence"). But cf. D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1486-87 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating
that "handicaps can be legitimate reasons for exclusion from some jobs - unlike discrimination
based on race, ethnic origin, [or] sex .... This distinction renders... [disability] discrimination
less invidious").
4. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYiENT DIscRMINATIoN LAWS 2 (1992) (observing that "protection against ... [disability]
discrimination... [has become] a dominant theme within our legal culture").
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comprehensive example is Congress' enactment of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"),5 the stated purpose of which is to

provide a comprehensive national mandate that eliminates discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.6 The ADA has been said to reflect
a "virtual revolution in the area of rights for the disabled."7
However, the desirability of eliminating disability discrimination has
not always been so clear.' One commentator noted that when Congress

enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), which
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color,

religion, sex and national origin,"0 there was little public sentiment to
regulate discrimination against persons with disabilities." Congress
subsequently rejected a number of attempts to amend Title VII to

prohibit disability discrimination 2 before finally enacting the ADA,

more than twenty-five years after Title VII was passed, to address the

limitations of existing disability discrimination legislation.' 3
One manifestation of society's delayed recognition of the need to

eliminate disability discrimination 4 is a wide variation in the language
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1994).
6. Id. § 12101(b)(1); Fink v. Kitzman, 881 F. Supp. 1347, 1370 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Trautz,
819 F. Supp. at 294. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 480 (stating that "Congress has
provided a major piece of legislation with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
which ushers in an em of extensive regulation ... of the employment relationship").
7. Trautz, 819 F. Supp. at 294.
8. Prior to the enactment of the ADA, federal antidiscrimination legislation only addressed
disability discrimination by federal agencies and recipients of federal financial assistance. S. REP.
No. 101-116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1989). Private employers were not prohibited from
discriminating against applicants or employees with disabilities unless they were protected by state
antidiscrimination legislation. Maureen O'Connor, Note, Defining "Handicap"forPurposes of
Employment Discrimination,30 ARIZ. L. REv. 633, 649 (1988).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
10. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
11. EPSTEIN, supranote 4, at 2; see also Barbara Hoffman, Employment DiscriminationBased
on CancerHistory: The Need for FederalLegislation, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 9 (1986) (stating that
"[1]egal advocacy on behalf of victims of employment discrimination based on their real and
perceived disabilities is relatively new in the history of the American civil rights movement").
12. See Fink, 881 F. Supp. at 1368 (asserting that "[p]eriodically through the mid-1980's there
had been attempts to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include people with disabilities.");
O'Connor, supra note 8, at 648-49 (stating that "[h]ad Congress been fully intent on protecting the
civil rights of handicapped people, it could have accepted one of a number of attempts to amend
Title VII ... to include... handicap.'); Hoffman, supranote 11, at 14 n.73 (stating that "attempts
to... amend Title VII [to include the handicapped as a protected class] have failed').
13. Fink, 881 F. Supp. at 1368.
14. See 134 CONG. REc. S5, 110 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988) (statement of Sen. Weicker).
Weicker stated "[i]t is high time that we as a society formally and forcefully prohibit the discrimination that is the greatest handicap to Americans with disabilities." Id.; Hoffman, supra note
11, at 9-10 (stating that "[d]espite more than a century of protective legislation focusing on race and
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of statutes addressing the issue,"5 due in many cases to the need for

disability rights advocates to engage in political compromise in order to
obtain any protection at all.' 6 In particular, both the ADA 17 and its
less ambitious predecessor,' 8 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,'9 as well
as a number of state employment discrimination statutes, 0 prohibit
discrimination against an individual because of a perceived disability.2 '
Other state legislatures have not defined the terms "handicap" or
"disability 22 to include perceived disabilities 23 when enacting employ-

gender, .. . people with real and perceived disabilities were without significant federal remedies until ... 1973).
15. See O'Connor, supra note 8, at 634 (referring to "the variety of definitions [of 'handicap']
contained in state statutory provisions"); Hoffman, supra note 11, at 14 (concluding that "[a]lthough
each state that statutorily prohibits employment discrimination based on handicap describes the
protected class as either 'handicapped' or 'disabled,' state statutes vary widely in their definitions
of 'handicap' and 'disability").
16. See Drimmer, supra note 2, at 1393 (observing that although there is a "recognition that
society discriminates against people with disabilities," they have only been granted "partial protection
and guarantee[d partial rights" as a matter of "political compromise"); Steven J. Rollins, Comment,
Perceived Handicap Under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 639, 644
(stating that the legal definition of handicap "reflects the blend of medical and social considerations
upon which public policy decisions, such as eligibility for entitlements or protection from
discrimination, are based"); cf.O'Connor, supra note 8, at 648 (observing that "the Rehabilitation
Act represents a compromise").
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1994).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1988 & Supp. V 1994). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 has been
described as the "first broad federal statute aimed at eradicating discrimination against individuals
with disabilities." Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 330 (3d Cir. 1995); see also EPSTEIN, supra
note 4, at 483 (describing the Rehabilitation Act as the "initial legislative foray in this area"). The
ADA was enacted, "in part, to address perceived inadequacies in the Rehabilitation Act." Fink v.
Kitzman, 881 F. Supp. 1347, 1368 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
20. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.010(10) (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN § 49.60.180 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(8) (West 1988).
21. Bogue v. Better-Bitt Aluminum Co., 875 P.2d 1327, 1334 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); see also
Hoffman, supranote 11, at 14-15 (noting that "[a]t least fifteen states borrow language from.., the
Rehabilitation Act to protect not only those who suffer a disability, but those who are regarded or
perceived to be disabled").
22. The trend is in favor of replacing the term "handicap" with the term "disability," see
Capitano v. Arizona, 875 P.2d 832, 834 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993), in part because individuals with
disabilities often object to being characterized as "handicapped." See Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d
325, 330 n.8 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that "[the change in nomenclature from 'handicap' to
'disability' reflects ... awareness that individuals with disabilities find the term 'handicapped'
objectionable"); O'Connor, supra note 8, at 635 n.16 (stating that "[d]isabled individuals often
vehemently protest being labelled as handicapped"). However, because a number of states continue
to utilize the term handicap, see, e.g., Bogue v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Co., 875 P.2d 1327, 1331-32
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994), both terms are used in this article; cf. Emily A. Spieler, Injured Workers,
Workers' Compensation, and Work: New Perspectives on the Workers' Compensation Debate in
West Virginia, 95 W. VA. L. REv. 333, 381 n.177 (1992-93) (arguing that "[tihe use of the term
'handicap' in state law is equivalent to the current use of the term 'disability' in the more recently
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ment discrimination legislation,24 or have adopted definitions that appear
to exclude from coverage persons who are mistakenly perceived to be
disabled. 5
In interpreting these various statutes, courts have reached differing
results. 26 This is not surprising, given that the legal principles pertain27
ing to perceived disabilities have been described as "elusive, at best.
This article explores those principles and some of the cases considering
them, 28 and, where applicable, subsequent legislative responses to those

cases.29 The article also discusses the policy considerations underlying31
the perceived disability issue," ° as well as its practical ramifications.

enacted ADA" (citations omitted)); Thomas E. Seguine, Comment, What's a Handicap,Anyway?
Analyzing HandicapClaims Under the RehabilitationAct of 1973 and Analogous State Statutes, 22
WILLvAEr L. REv. 529, 552 n.125 (1986) (explaining that "the term 'disabled' ... is analogous
to 'handicap' as used in [employment discrimination] statutes"). But cf.Rollins, supra note 16, at
643 n.24 (commenting that "[a] substantial debate exists over the interchangeability - or lack of
it - [between] the terms... disability, and handicap").
23. A "perceived" disability can arise in several contexts. The term can apply to an individual
with an impairment mistakenly viewed by the employer as a limiting condition when in fact it does
not significantly restrict the individual's employment abilities. Bogue, 875 P.2d at 1335. The
concept also applies to an individual with an impairment that does limit his or her ability to secure,
retain or advance in employment, but only because of the attitudes of others toward the impairment.
Id. Finally, a perceived handicap may exist where the employer erroneously believes an individual
has an impairment that the individual does not actually have. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 486
N.W.2d 657, 660 (Mich. 1992); Chico Dairy Co. v. West Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d
75, 86 (W. Va. 1989) (Workman, J., dissenting); Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 591 P.2d
461, 465 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). It apparently was to the latter situation that the term was first
applied. See Rollins, supra note 16, at 640 n.8.
24. See Chico Dairy, 382 S.E.2d at 83.
25. See, e.g., id. at 78 n.1.
26. Compare Bogue v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Co., 875 P.2d 1327, 1330 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that the Arizona Civil Rights Act "implicitly prohibits discrimination against individuals
who have a perceived handicap") with Chico Dairy,382 S.E.2d at 84 (holding that the West Virginia
Human Rights Act requires "an actual, existing handicap"). See generally Turner v. City of Monroe,
634 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (observing that "some state jurisdictions allow recovery
under their handicap anti-discrimination statutes only upon proof of an actual handicap," while other
states allow recovery if the employer discriminates against an employee because of a perceived
handicap).
27. Fourco Glass Co. v. West Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 383 S.E.2d 64, 66 n.* (,V. Va.
1989).
28. One court recently noted that "[u]p to this point in time, .. . few 'perceived disability'
cases have been litigated and, consequently, decisional law ... is hen's-teeth rare." Cook v. Rhode
Island, 10 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1993).
29. See, e.g., Sanchez, 486 N.W.2d at 659 n.13, 662 (Mich. 1992) (referring to the Michigan
legislature's amendment of the Michigan Handicapper's Civil Rights Act to include perceived
disabilities within the statutory definition of "handicap" after the Michigan Court of Appeals had
held that the Act did not apply to perceived disabilities).
30. See infra notes 173-95 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 251-73 and accompanying text.
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The article concludes that although, as a matter of policy, individuals
who are erroneously perceived to be disabled ordinarily should be
protected by disability discrimination legislation, a legislature legitimately
might choose not to provide such protection. 32 Further, courts should
not lightly assume that a legislature's silence on the issue is consistent
with an intent to prohibit perceived disability discrimination.3 3
I. THE CASES
A. Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co.
The first state court decision to consider the perceived disability
issue, Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co.,34 involved a plaintiff who
claimed to have been wrongfully terminated because his employer
mistakenly believed that he suffered from epilepsy.35 The plaintiff
alleged that a termination based upon a perceived but nonexistent
disability 36 violated the Washington State Law Against Discrimination.37
The employer argued that by prohibiting discharges based upon the
presence of a "sensory, mental or physical handicap, 38 the Washington
legislature had limited the class protected by the statute to persons who
actually have a disability.39 The court disagreed, however, relying upon
an administrative regulation adopted by the Washington State Human
Rights Commission4" that included conditions that are "perceived to
exist, whether or not [they] exist-] in fact" within the definition of
handicap.41 Rejecting the contention that the Commission had exceeded
its authority in promulgating this regulation,4 2 the court held that the act

32. See infra notes 274-85 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
34. 591 P.2d 461 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
35. Id. at 462.
36. Id.
37. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
38. Id. § 49.60.180.
39. Barnes, 591 P.2d at 463-64. The terms "sensory, mental, or physical handicaps" were not
defined in the statute. Seguine, supra note 22, at 551 n.123.
40. The Washington State Human Rights Commission is an agency established by the
Washington State Law Against Discrimination "with powers with respect to elimination and
prevention of discrimination in employment." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010.
41. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-22-040(1)(b)(iii) (1995).
42. See Barnes, 591 P.2d at 463-65.
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protected both the disabled and those perceived to be disabled.4 3 The
court supported its decision with the following explanation:
The essence of unlawful employment discrimination is the application
of unreasonable generalizations about people to the hiring, promotion
and discharge of workers.... Proscriptions of discrimination against
handicapped persons were added ... because of... prejudgments
often made about persons afflicted with sensory, mental or physical
handicaps, such as epilepsy.
...It would defeat legislative purpose to limit the handicap provisions
of the law against discrimination to those who are actually afflicted
with a handicap ... and exclude from its provision those perceived as
having such a condition.... The intent of the law is to protect workers
against ... prejudgment based upon insufficient information. The
law's application, therefore, should not be limited to those who actually
have handicaps, excluding those who are discriminated against in the
same way because they are only thought to have handicaps.'
B.

Chico Dairy Co. v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm 'n

The Barnes decision was contradicted ten years later by the West
Virginia Supreme Court in Chico Dairy Co. v. West Virginia Human
Rights Commission.45 In Chico Dairy, the plaintiff wore a prosthetic
eye after losing her left eye to cancer as an infant.46 Apparently, the
plaintiff's eye socket around the prosthesis had become somewhat sunken
47
or hollow.
The plaintiff was employed as an assistant manager in one of the
employer's stores. 4' After twice being passed over for promotion, she
resigned.49 She filed a complaint with the West Virginia Human Rights
Commission alleging that her resignation constituted a constructive
discharge,5 and that her employer had unlawfully discriminated against

43. Id. at 465.
44. Id. at 464-65.
45. 382 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1989).
46. Id. at 77.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 77-78.
50. Id. at 78. Under West Virginia law, a constructive discharge occurs when "working
conditions created by or known to the employer were so intolerable that a reasonable person would
be compelled to quit." Slack v. Kanawha County -ous. & Redevelopment Auth., 423 S.E.2d 547,
558 (W. Va. 1992). Generally speaking, the discriminatory denial of a promotion, standing alone,
does not rise to the level of a constructive discharge. See, e.g., Davis v. Pioneer Screw & Nut Co.,
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her on the basis of an "alleged" handicap."' The latter allegation was
based upon evidence that the plaintiff had been denied promotions
because of a supervisor's concern that her appearance might be
objectionable to the employer's customers.52 The plaintiff did not
contend that she was disabled, but instead "refer[red] to53the manner in
which the employer regardedher physical appearance."
Following an evidentiary hearing, the West Virginia Human Rights
Commission concluded that the employer violated the West Virginia
Human Rights Act5 4 by discriminating against the plaintiff on the basis
The West
of what the area supervisor believed to be a disability.5
Virginia Circuit Court reversed on appeal, holding that the Commission's
finding of discrimination was erroneous as a matter of law because the
56
statute required an actual, and not merely a perceived, impairment.
Both the plaintiff and the Human Rights Commission appealed. 7
The West Virginia Supreme Court began its analysis with the
unremarkable observation that the proper interpretation of the West
Virginia Human Rights Act depends in part upon the statutory definition

706 F. Supp. 547, 549 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
51. Chico Dairy, 382 S.E.2d at 78.
Such "customer preference" defenses have been rejected in most
52. Id. at 77-78.
discrimination contexts. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.)
("[I]t would be totally anomalous ... to allow the preferences and prejudices of... customers to
determine whether ... discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very
prejudices (employment discrimination laws were] meant to overcome."), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971). Disability discrimination cases are no exception. See, e.g., Fink v. Kitzman, 881 F. Supp.
1347, 1369-70 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (describing the pervasive discrimination persons with disabilities
have experienced on the purported ground that "others would feel uncomfortable around them").
However, the defense retains some vitality, both in the disability discrimination context and
elsewhere. Compare Hodgdon v. Mount Mansfield Co., 624 A.2d 1122, 1132 (Vt. 1992) (leaving
open the possibility that an employer regarding an individual as "unfit to be seen by customers"
might show that "a particular physical condition is a bona fide occupational qualification for a
particular job") with Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 559 (2d Cir. 1981)
(concluding that Title VII's "bona fide occupational qualification" defense must be applied in a
manner that gives "due weight to ... a person's... acceptability to those persons with whom the
[employer] does business").
53. Chico Dairy,382 S.E.2d at 78 (emphasis added); see also id. at 80 n.4 (observing that the
plaintiff had alleged a violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act "on the basis of the
employer's perception of a 'facial deformity,' not on the basis of blindness or an actual handicap").
54. W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-I to 5-11-19 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1995). The Act made it
unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation, hire,
tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment if the individual is able and competent to
perform the services required even if such individual is blind or handicapped .... " Id. § 5-11-9.
55. Chico Dairy, 382 S.E.2d at 78.

56. Id.
57. Id.
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'
of "handicap."58
Under that definition, the court noted, "[t]he term
'handicap' means any physical or mental impairment which 59substantially
limits one or more of an individual's major life activities."
While individuals who are merely perceived to be disabled do not
fall within the statutory definition,60 the West Virginia Human Rights
Commission adopted an "interpretive rule" that purported to expand the
statutory definition to provide protection for persons who were regarded
as having a disability.61 This rule was adopted verbatim from the
definition of handicap appearing in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.62
A footnote explaining the purpose of the rule stated that an
expansion of the statutory definition was required to make clear that the
law prohibited discrimination against both disabled individuals and those
incorrectly perceived to be disabled.63 The drafters of the rule explained that discrimination on the basis of a perceived disability is as
grounded in prejudice or stereotypes about the abilities of a person who
is not physically or mentally "normal" as is discrimination on the basis
of an actual disability.'
Expressing no disagreement with these policy arguments, 65 the
West Virginia Supreme Court held that the rule was invalid because it
enlarged the statutory definition beyond the legislature's intent.66 The
court based its holding upon the fact that while the state statutory
definition had been adopted after perceived disability protection had been
added to the federal Rehabilitation Act definition,67 the West Virginia

58. Id. at 79. See generally O'Connor, supra note 8, at 633:

[N]early every state has enacted statutory protections for handicapped persons in the
workplace. More than in any other area of civil rights litigation, the effectiveness of
these protections has turned on the definition given to the protected class -

both in the

manner in which the legislature has chosen to define "handicap," and in the ways in
which the courts have construed and interpreted that definition.
O'Connor, supra note 8, at 633.
59. Chico Dairy,382 S.E.2d at 79 n.3 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(t) (1981)).
60. See id. at 84. "The West Virginia statute requires an actual, existing handicap." Id.
61. Id. at 79 (quoting W. VA. CODE OF STATE RULES § 77-1-2.7 (1982)).

62. See id. at 79, 84. The Rehabilitation Act defines an "individual with a disability" to mean
"any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as

having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
63. Chico Dairy,382 S.E.2d at 79 n.3, 80.

64. Id. at 80.
65. See id. at 85 n.10.
66. Id. at 80. The court also held, in the alternative, that the rule was invalid because it was

a "legislative" rather than an "interpretive" rule and had not been promulgated in accordance with
the statutory requirements applicable to legislative rules. Id. at 80-82.

67. Id. at 84.
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legislature in "obvious contrast" had adopted a more restrictive definition
requiring an actual, existing disability. 8 Therefore, the court concluded, the Commission's rule conflicted with the clear legislative intent by
expanding the rights created by the statute. 9
The Chico Dairy court distinguished Barnes v. Washington Natural
Gas Co." on the grounds that the statute at issue in Barnes did not
define the term "handicap."7' 1 In addition, contrary to the administrative
rule invalidated by the Chico Dairy court, the administrative regulation
providing protection for individuals with perceived disabilities in Barnes
fell "within the state administrative agency's broad authority to
promulgate rules and regulations having the force and effect of law
without legislative review and approval."'72
The Chico Dairy court's holding was temporally limited by the
West Virginia legislature's intervening amendment to the West Virginia
Human Rights Act which made the statutory definition of handicap73
identical to the federal definition encompassing perceived disabilities.
The West Virginia Supreme Court nevertheless confirmed the Chico
Dairy holding in subsequent cases where it was determined that the
amended statutory definition was not applicable.74
For example, in Casteel v. Consolidation Coal Co.,"s the court
observed that in both ChicoDairy and an earlier case, RangerFuel Corp.
v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission,76 it had refused to expand
the statutory definition of handicap by holding that the legislature
"clearly intended to limit the protection of the Human Rights Act to
those individuals with substantial handicaps."7' 7 In Fourco Glass Co.
v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 8 the court likewise
applied the Chico Dairy decision to reject the claim of an employment

68. Id.
69. Id. The court found additional support for its holding in the fact that while the case was
on appeal, the West Virginia legislature had amended the state act to include within the definition
of "individual[s] with handicaps" those persons who are "regarded as having... an impairment."

Id. at 85 n.10 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(t)). The court concluded that the amendment was
evidence that the legislature had intended to change the law. Id.
70. 591 P.2d 461 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979).
71. Chico Dairy,382 S.E.2d at 83.

72. Id.
73. See id. at 85 n.10.
74. The amendment did not become effective until July 1, 1989; see id.; Fourco Glass Co. v.
West Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 383 S.E.2d 64, 66 (W. Va. 1989).
75. 383 S.E.2d 305 (W. Va. 1989).
76. 376 S.E.2d 154 (W. Va. 1988).

77. Casteel, 383 S.E.2d at 308.
78. 383 S.E.2d 64 (W. Va. 1989).
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applicant asserting that he had not been hired as a result of a perceived
disability.79 The court commented that prior to the passage of the
statutory amendment, the West Virginia Human Rights Commission did
not have the authority to fashion an interpretive rule because the statute
did not treat a perceived disability as an actual disability."0
C. Annear v. Iowa
The Iowa Supreme Court reached essentially the same result in
Annear v. Iowa.8 The plaintiff in Annear was employed as a maintenance worker at a facility operated by the Iowa Department of Public
Defense. 2 During the final years of the plaintiff's employment, he was
assigned to light duty due to a back injury.83 He ultimately applied for
long-term disability benefits under the employer's disability insurance
policy, and began receiving such benefits immediately after his employment was terminated.'"
After back surgery improved the plaintiff's condition, he sought to
return to his former position. 5 Although his physician provided the
employer with a medical release stating that the plaintiff was capable of
returning to work and performing the duties of his former position, 6 the
plaintiff was informed that there were no vacancies due to budgetary
restraints.87 Moreover, the employer told the plaintiff that when
additional employees were considered, there will be no favoritism and
that all applicants would compete on an equal footing.88
After a lower classified position for which the plaintiff had applied
was filled by another applicant, 9 the plaintiff filed suit against the
employer under the Iowa Civil Rights Act.9" The plaintiff contended
that the employer's stated reason for declining to rehire him - "the

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See id. at 65.
Id. at 66.
454 N.W.2d 869 (Iowa 1990).
Id. at 870.
Id.
Id. at 870-71.
Id. at 871.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
IOWA CODE ANN.§§ 216.1-216.20 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995).
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relative merit of the competing applicants"'" - was pretextual, and that
the real reason for refusal was the plaintiff's perceived physical
disability.'
The plaintiff argued that he was entitled to a jury instruction which
defined disabled persons as including individuals "who are regarded as
being handicapped although not in fact deserving that characterization." 93 The plaintiff relied on an administrative regulation promulgated
by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission?' as an aid in administering the
Iowa Civil Rights Act.95 That regulation defined disabled persons as
individuals having a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of their major life activities.96 The regulation went
on to define a person "regarded" as having an impairment as one who
"[h]as none of the impairments defined to be 'physical or mental
impairments,' but is perceived as having such an impairment."97
In a previous decision, the Iowa Supreme Court relied upon this
regulation to conclude that individuals who are not actually disabled but
whose employers nevertheless perceive them to be disabled are
considered to be "disabled" under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. 98 The
Annear court rejected this proposition, however, holding that an
employer's failure to hire an applicant because it erroneously believed he
was unable to work would not constitute unlawful discrimination
prohibited by the Iowa Civil Rights Act.99 The court concluded that
applying the administrative regulation to such a decision would expand
the scope of disability discrimination claims beyond the breadth of the
statute by which they had been created. 1' Not surprisingly, the court
stated that this situation would be improper because agency action in

91. Annear, 454 N.W.2d at 874. "A desire to hire the more experienced or better qualified
applicant is a nondiscriminatory, legitimate [basis for] a hiring decision." Holder v. Old Ben Coal
Co., 618 F.2d 1198, 1202 (7th Cir. 1980).
92. Annear, 454 N.W.2d at 874. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the employer's
representatives involved in the hiring process erroneously believed that his disability continued to
exist after his corrective surgery. Id.
93. Id.
94. The Iowa Civil Rights Commission has the statutory authority to "adopt, publish, amend

and rescind regulations consistent with and necessary for the enforcement" of the Iowa Civil Rights
Act. Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 475 (Iowa 1983) (quoting IowA
CODE § 601A.5(10) (1981)).
95. Annear,454 N.V.2d at 875.
96. IoWA ADMiN. CODE § 8.26(l) (1993).

97. Id. § 8.26(5).
98. Frank v. American Freight Sys., 398 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Iowa 1987).
99. Annear, 454 N.W.2d at 875.
100. Id.
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promulgating rules cannot exceed the agency's statutory authority.''
The precise impact of the Annear holding was clouded by the
court's suggestion that the regulation might apply in a situation involving
a "categorical organic disorder of the body."'0 2 The court's only
indication of what it meant by this suggestion was its reference to
Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission,103 where the fact that the
plaintiff was viewed adversely by others did not persuade the court that
she was necessarily perceived as having a physical or mental impairment."°4 Instead, the Sommers cofurt concluded that an individual's
physical condition must independently fall within the definition of
"impairment," which "relates to an organic disorder of the body," before
the perceptions of others are considered in determining if the condition
is a substantial disability.'05
Notwithstanding the Annear court's arguable qualification of its
holding, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
concluded thatAnnearprohibits individuals who are merely perceived to
be disabled from claiming the protection of the Iowa Civil Rights
Act. 1 6 Other recent Iowa cases are more equivocal. For example, in
0 7 the Iowa Supreme
Henkel Corp. v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission,"
Court indicated that the regulation at issue in Annear may continue to
give content to the statutory definition." 8 In Miller v. Sioux Gateway
FireDepartment,'0 9 the court quoted from a pre-Annear case, Probasco
v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission,"' that defined "handicapped individual" so that it included a person regarded as having a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits a major life activity."' And in
Fink v. Kitzman,"2 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa stated that under Iowa law, a disabled person includes
any person with a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities, or who is regarded as having such an

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983).
104. Id. at 476-77.
105. Id. at 476.

106. Mowat v. Transportation Unlimited, 984 F.2 230, 232 (8th Cir. 1992).
107. 471 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa 1991).

108. Id. at 810.
109. 497 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa 1993).
110. 420 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1988).

111. Miller, 497 N.W.2d at 841.
112. 881 F. Supp. 1347 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
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impairment.'
Since none of the recent Iowa cases directly address the issue of
whether the Iowa Civil Rights Act covers perceived disabilities,1 the
Eighth Circuit's characterization of Annear appears to be the operative
one." 5 As noted earlier," 6 that characterization is consistent with the

West Virginia Supreme Court's interpretation of the West Virginia
Human Rights Act in Chico Dairy v. West Virginia Human Rights
Commission'17 and its progeny."'
D. Sanchez v. Lagoudakis
In Sanchez v. Lagoudakis,119 the Michigan Court of Appeals
reached a strikingly similar result. 2 The plaintiff in Sanchez was
After hearing
employed as a waitress in the defendant's restaurant.'
a rumor that the plaintiff contracted acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome ("AIDS"), the employer informed the plaintiff that she was
prohibited from returning to work until she had secured medical evidence
indicating that she did not have the disease."2 Although the results of
the plaintiff's subsequent blood test were negative, she refused to return
to work because she had been thoroughly embarrassed by the entire

incident. 123
The plaintiff brought suit under the Michigan Handicappers' Civil
Rights Act, 24 alleging that the employer unlawfully discriminated

113. Id. at 1378.
114. In Miller, for example, the court was able to avoid the perceived disability issue because
"the evidence showed an actual impairment." Miller, 497 N.W.2d at 841. The plaintiff in Henkel
Corp. was likewise found to be disabled because he suffered from a "mental condition [that]
substantially limited his ability to work and learn." Henkel Corp., 471 N.W.2d at 810. Finally,
although the plaintiff in Fink suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome, the court concluded that the
employer did not believe that her condition "even... impaired [her] job performance," let alone that
it rendered her disabled. Fink,881 F. Supp. at 1379. Thus, while the court apparently assumed that
the Iowa Civil Rights Act prohibits perceived disability discrimination, it was not actually required
to decide that issue. See id. at 1377-79.
115. Surprisingly, Annear was not even discussed in Miller, Henkel Corp. or Fink.
116. See supra notes 45, 50 and accompanying text.
117. 382 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1989).
118. See supra notes 45, 50 and accompanying text.
119. 457 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 486 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. 1992).
120. See id. at 375.
121. Id. at 374.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.1101-1607 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

13

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 2
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[V/ol. 13:2

against her on the basis of a disability.125 The trial court granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment, 126 finding that the plaintiff
suffered no actual disability within the meaning
of the Act, and that the
127
absence of a disability prohibited recovery.
128
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling.
The court noted that the Act defined handicap as "a determinable
physical or mental characteristic of an individual or a history of the
characteristic which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition
of birth, or functional disorder ... .,,121 Because the plaintiff had no
actual "determinable physical or mental characteristic," she did not fall
within the statutory definition. 3 ' The court reasoned that if the
Michigan legislature had intended for the statute to apply to perceived
disabilities, it would have so stated, and therefore the court refused to
expand the statutory definition to include situations where "no handicap
exists but others perceive such a handicap."''
The court found no
support for a contrary interpretation in cases involving the federal
Rehabilitation Act 3 2 because, unlike the Michigan statute, the Rehabilitation Act specifically includes perceived disabilities within its definition
of handicap. 3 3
The decisions in Sanchez, Chico Dairy Co. v. West Virginia Human
Rights Commission,34 and Annear v. Iowa' are consistent with the
United States Supreme Court's analysis in Shaare Tefila Congregation
v. Cobb.'3 6 In Shaare Tefila Congregation, members of a Jewish
congregation sued various defendants who had spray-painted the walls of
the congregation's synagogue with anti-Semitic graffiti, alleging that the
defendants' actions were motivated by racial prejudice, and therefore

125. Sanchez, 457 N.W.2d at 374.
126. The court nevertheless conditioned dismissal of the plaintiff's claim upon the employer's
reimbursing the plaintiff for lost wages, costs and attorneys' fees. Id. The Michigan Court of
Appeals characterized this aspect of the trial court's ruling as "suspect," but declined to review it

further because it had not been raised on appeal. Id.
127. Id.

128. Id. at 375.
129. Id. (quoting MICH. CoMP. LAws §37.1103(b)).
130. Id.
131. Id.

132. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
133. Sanchez, 457 NAV.2d at 375 (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B)).
134. 382 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1989).
135. 454 N.W.2d 869 (Iowa 1990).
136. 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
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violated 42 U.S.C. § 1982,137 which forbids racially discriminatory
interference with property rights. 3
The plaintiffs apparently conceded that Jewish people are not a
racially distinct group,'39 but argued that their claim nevertheless was
actionable because the defendants "viewed Jews as [being] racially
distinct."1 40 The district court disagreed and dismissed the claim. 144 '2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed,
holding that section 1982 does not apply to "situations in which a
plaintiff is not a member of a racially distinct group but is merely
perceived to be so."'"4 The Supreme Court apparently agreed with that
analysis:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that a charge of racial discrimination within the meaning of § 1982 cannot be made out by alleging only
that the defendants were motivated by racial animus; it is necessary as
-wellto allege that defendants' animus was directed towards the kind of
group that Congress intended to protect when it passed the statute. To
hold otherwise would unacceptably extend the reach of the statute.'"
Although Shaare Tefila Congregation involved perceived racial
discrimination, the analogy to perceived disability discrimination is
obvious."
However, the analysis in Shaare Tefila Congregation
137. Section 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
138. Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 616.
139. Id. On this point, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the relevant inquiry is not
"whether Jews are considered to be a separate race by today's standards, but whether, at the time
§ 1982 was adopted, Jews constituted a group of people Congress intended to protect," and held that
at the time § 1982 was enacted, "Jews ...were among the peoples then considered to be distinct
races ....
" Id. at 617-18.
140. Id. at 616 (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 785 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 615
(1987).
143. Shaare Tefila Congregation,481 U.S. at 617.
144. Id. The Supreme Court nevertheless reversed the Court of Appeals' decision on the ground
that Jewish people are not merely perceived to be a racially distinct group but, for purposes of
section 1982, are in fact a "distinct race[]." Id. at 617-18.
145. See Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. 1988) ("Just as plaintiffs in
Federal Title VII and age discrimination actions must show that they are members of a protected
class, [a plaintiff] must first show that she is within the protected class before she can recover under
[a handicap discrimination statute].") (authority omitted); Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co.,
591 P.2d 461, 465 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that just as a person perceived to belong to a
minority racial or ethnic group "may be discriminated against because of [her] perceived racial
characteristics, a person... may be discriminated against because of his or her perceived handicap
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actually begs the critical issue, which is identifyring
precisely what group
46
it is that the legislature intended to protect.1
Less than one week after the Michigan Court of Appeals decided
Sanchez v. Lagoudakis,'4 7 the Michigan legislature gave notice that the

Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act was intended to protect
individuals who are perceived to be disabled 4 ' by amending the act to
include perceived disabilities within the definition of handicap.149 That
expression of legislative intent prompted the Michigan Supreme Court to
reverse the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision in Sanchez and observe
that "[c]learly, under the current version, when the act ... speaks of

discrimination by an employer against an individual because of a
handicap, this includes an individual who, while not handicapped, is
regarded as having a handicap."'

0

E. Burnis v. City of Phoenix and Bogue v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Co.

In Burnis v. City of Phoenix,5' the plaintiff applied for a job as
a firefighter with the City of Phoenix. 52 After he passed the required

pre-employment tests, the City offered him a position.'53 When the

even though that perception turns out to be false in either case.").
146. Shaare Tefila Congregation,481 U.S. at 617. In Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co.,
for example, the Washington Court of Appeals interpreted a state employment discrimination statute
as providing protection against discrimination on the basis of perceived disabilities by concluding
that "[t]he class protected by the statute is those persons whom the employer discharges or intends
to discharge because he believes the person is afflicted with a 'sensory, mental, or physical
handicap."' 591 P.2d 461, 465 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.180) (emphasis added).
147. 457 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 486 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. 1992).
148. Cf.Rogers v, Campbell Foundry Co., 447 A.2d 589, 591 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982)
(holding that "those perceived as suffering from a particular handicap are as much within the
protected class as those who are actually handicapped'), cert. denied, 453 A.2d 852 (N.J. 1982);
Falm v. Cowlitz County, 610 P.2d 857, 867 (Wash. 1980) (Dolliver, J., dissenting) (reasoning "if
the [condition] of an employee or an applicant for employment is perceived by the employer to be
a physical handicap, then, by action of the employer, the plaintiffs are in a protected class').
149. See Sanchez, 486 N.W.2d at 659 n.13, 662 (Mich. 1992) (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 37.1103(e)).
150. Id. at 662. However, the statute actually at issue in Sanchez was the pre-amendment
version, which was silent as to the perceived disability issue. See id. at 659-60 & n.13, 662. The
Michigan Supreme Court's reliance upon the statutory amendment to support its implicit conclusion
that the statute originally covered perceived disabilities is questionable, and in any event inconsistent
with the analysis in Chico Dairy Co. v. West Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75, 85 n.10
(W. Va. 1989), where a similar statutory amendment was found to reflect a "change" in the law.
151. 875 P.2d 1340 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
152. Id. at 1342.
153. Id.
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City later learned that the plaintiff had a history of cancer, the City
rescinded the offer even though the plaintiff no longer had the disease.

154

The trial court ruled that the City had violated the Arizona Civil
Rights Act (the "ACRA") 155 by refusing to hire the plaintiff solely
because of its perception that he was disabled. t5 6 The City argued on
appeal that the plaintiff's history of cancer did not meet the statutory
definition of "handicap" under the ACRA, 157 and that the trial court
had erred by expanding the definition to include individuals with
15 8
perceived disabilities.
The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the City's argument.15 9
The court concluded that cancer is a handicap within the meaning of the
ACRA, t60 and that the act covered an individual who no longer had
61
cancer but was denied a job on the basis of a history of cancer.
"Thus, Burris holds that an individual may be handicapped if he once
had a condition which, although now of no effect, continues to substan-

tially restrict or limit that individual's general ability to secure, retain or
advance in employment because of the stigma associated with the
154. Id. at 1342-43.
155. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1461 to 41-1484 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
156. Burnis, 875 P.2d at 1343.
157. Id. at 1344. At the time, the Arizona Civil Rights Act defined a "handicap" as a "physical
impairment that substantially restricts or limits an individual's general ability to secure, retain or
advance in employment." ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461(4), amended by 1994 ARIZ. LAWS, ch.
258, § 1.
158. Burris, 875 P.2d at 1344. The trial court had stated:
Court and counsel have argued over the definition of "handicap." The legislature seems
to favor a narrow definition, while Appellate Courts and the Federal system opt for a
more liberal definition. In this case, the City treated [the plaintiff] as if he were
handicapped.
They thought and perceived him to have a limitation when
they... refused to hire him.
To now say that they are vindicated because he doesn't fall into the Statutory definition
of handicap, is not appropriate.
Equity and public policy will not allow such a result.
Id. at 1343-44 (emphasis in original).
159. See id. at 1343-45.
160. Id. at 1345; but cf. Andrews v. Jones Truck Lines, 741 F. Supp. 867, 872 (D. Kan. 1990)
(plaintiff "failed] to meet the threshold requirement [of establishing] that he [was] handicapped"
because he had "not proffered any evidence that his cancerous condition ha[d] in any way
substantially limited any of his life's activities"); Lyons v. Heritage House Restaurants, Inc., 432
N.E.2d 270, 274 (Il1. 1982) (plaintiff was not handicapped within the meaning of state
antidiscrimination statute where she had "not alleged that her cancer ha[d] substantially hindered her
in any of [her major life] activities").
161. Burnis, 875 P.2d at 1345.
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condition."' 6 2
Although Burris has been characterized as a perceived disability

case, 63 it actually addressed discrimination on the basis of a "history"
of handicap,'

ination. 6

64

which is a slightly different theory of disability discrim-

The analysis in Burris is generally applicable to both

theories,' 66 however, and was expressly extended to perceived
disability
167
Co.
Aluminum
Better-Bilt
v.
Bogue
in
discrimination
The plaintiff in Bogue alleged that the defendant unlawfully refused68

to hire him because it perceived him to have a hearing impairment.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
and the plaintiff appealed. 169

The Arizona Court of Appeals relied

upon its analysis in Burris"' in holding that the trial court had
erred, 171 stating: "We cannot on the one hand conclude that the ACRA

provides protection to applicants whose physical impairment substantially
limits their general employability and on the other hand deny protection

to those172applicants whom employers only regardas having such impairment.

,

III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

There is no question that individuals erroneously perceived to have
a disability are denied employment opportunities because of the
prejudiced attitudes or ignorance of others. 3 In Burris v. City of

Phoenix,"4 for example, the court cited evidence that individuals who
have been cured of cancer frequently face barriers to employment
162. Bogue v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Co., 875 P.2d 1327, 1335 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
163. See Bogue, 875 P.2d at 1335; Capitano v. Arizona, 875 P.2d 832, 835 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1993).
164. See Bogue, 875 P.2d at 1335.
165. See Capitano,875 P.2d at 834-35 (observing that while the plaintiff could not recover on
the basis of a history of disability, the "'regarded as' basis for establishing a disability... arguably
[was] present"). However, both theories of recovery have been characterized as involving
"perceived" disabilities. See Bogue, 875 P.2d at 1335.
166. See Bogue, 875 P.2d at 1335 (concluding that persons with a "history of handicap" and
those who are merely "regarded" as having a handicap "both fall under the general category of
perceived handicaps").
167. 875 P.2d 1327 (Ariz. Ct. App, 1994).
168. Id. at 1329.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 1334-35.
171, See id. at 1334-36.
172, Id. at 1335.
173. See, e.g., School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
174. 875 P.2d 1340 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
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opportunities that are unrelated to their qualifications."' 5
Moreover, an individual who is incorrectly perceived to have a

disability may be as aggrieved by discriminatory treatment as a person
who actually has a disability. t7 6 In this regard, individuals with per-

ceived disabilities and those with77 actual disabilities may be equally

deserving of statutory protection.1
However, the primary purpose of laws prohibiting disability
discrimination is to insure that the "truly disabled" are free from
discrimination based on unfair stereotypes or prejudice.178 For this
reason, legislatures and courts generally conclude that individuals are not
entitled to protection unless they suffer from impairments that "significantly decrease [their] general ability to obtain satisfactory employment
79
elsewhere."'
Since employers presumably do not discriminate against individuals

they do not perceive to be disabled,'

a particular employer's mistaken

perception will seldom limit an individual's general ability to secure
employment elsewhere' unless the individual has some actual impairment - or history of an impairment - about which other employers
might form a similar (albeit mistaken) impression." 2 If this is the case,
many of the problems associated with perceived disability discrimination
can be addressed simply by expanding the protection afforded to persons

175. Id. at 1344-45.
176. Bay City Fire Dep't v. Department of Civil Rights, 451 N.W.2d 533, 535-36 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989) (Reilly, J., concurring); E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (D.Haw.
1980).
177. See June Z. Schau, Handicapped Workers: Who Should Bear the Burden of ProvingJob

Qualifications?,38 ME. L. REV. 135, 141 n.41 (1986).
178. Capitano, 875 P.2d at 836.
179. Bogue v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Co., 875 P.2d 1327, 1333 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
180. See, e.g., Fink v. Kitzman, 881 F. Supp. 1347, 1374, 1377 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
181. See Bogue, 875 P.2d at 1336 (holding that "if [an] employer refuses to hire an individual
because the individual is erroneously perceived to have [an] impairment, unless that perceived
impairment substantially restricts or limits the individual's general employability, the applicant is not
handicapped"); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (stating that
"refusal to hire someone for a single job does not in and of itself constitute perceiving the plaintiff
as a handicapped individual").
182. In Susie v. Apple Tree Preschool & Child Care Ctr., 866 F. Supp. 390, 392 n.3 (N.D. Iowa
1994), for example, the plaintiff was perceived to have epilepsy even though she "may not have
[had] epilepsy, but rather some other disorder." Id. See also Rose City Oil Co. v. Missouri Comm'n
on Human Rights, 832 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that plaintiff was not
protected by the perceived handicap provisions of the Missouri antidiscrimination statute because
he "suffer[ed] from nothing," and the statute required "the existence of a condition which might be
perceived to be a handicap?).
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with a history of disability,'8 3 or by interpreting the terms "disability"

or "impairment" somewhat more broadly, than has traditionally been the
case."

There may be little need to protect persons who are mistaken-

ly perceived to be disabled despite having no impairment (or a history
of an impairment),' however, because those individuals are likely to
suffer from discrimination only in relatively isolated, job-specific and
nonrecurring circumstances.' 8 6
Applying essentially the same analysis, some courts have refused to

extend protection to employees who have no physical limitations that an
employer could perceive to be disabilities.8 7 A legislature may engage

in similar reasoning... in declining to extend protection to individuals
who are erroneously perceived to be disabled despite having no actual
impairment, on the ground that only those persons who, because of a
disability, have substantial difficulty finding work are truly in need of

183. Cancer is a good example to analyze. See Estate of Latimer v. Filtronetics, Inc., 913
S.W.2d 51, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) ("Cancer, even in remission. . ., could be seen as a condition
that would substantially impair [a person's] major life activities."); Burris, 875 P.2d at 1344-45
(stating that "there is little question that cancer history raises barriers to employment opportunities
which are unrelated to a person's qualifications"). One commentator has observed that "(a]t least
two states specifically protect employees with a cancer history," and advocates the enactment of
federal legislation providing such protection by the use of definitional language "such as 'cancer
history' or 'medical condition."' Hoffman, supranote 11, at 14, 15. See generally Bogue, 875 P.2d
at 1335 (explaining that "an individual may be handicapped if he once had a condition which,
although now of no effect, continues to substantially restrict or limit that individual's general ability
to secure, retain or advance in employment because of the stigma associated with the condition");
Allen v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 64, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (recoguizing that "discrimination also occurs
against those who at one time had a disabling condition").
184. See, e.g., Bay City FireDep't., 451 N.W.2d at 534-35 (finding it unnecessary to determine
whether plaintiff could recover under a perceived disability theory because his congenital spinal
defect constituted an actual disability despite physician's conclusion that his spine was "normal,
healthy, and lacking pathological signs of degeneracy or trauma"); Chico Dairy Co. v. West Va.
Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75, 85-86 (W. Va. 1989) (Workman, J., dissenting) (arguing
that it was unnecessary to reach the issue of whether plaintiff had a perceived disability because her
blindness in one eye should have been treated as "an actual, existing handicap").
185. But cf Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1993) (observing that the
Rehabilitation Act's "perceived disability model can be satisfied whether or not a person actually
has a physical or mental impairment").
186. See American Motors Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 350 N.W.2d 120, 125
(Wis. 1984) (observing that the "particular concern" of perceived disability discrimination legislation
is "ensuring that the protections afforded by... handicap discrimination provisions also apply to
persons having a disability or impairment that does not actually .. limit the capacity to work but
nevertheless is perceived to do so") (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 125; Rose City Oil Co., 832 S.W.2d at 317.
188. But cf Rollins, supra note 16, at 653 (criticizing the view that there should be "some
unspecified threshold level of impairment which must be crossed" before an individual can be
perceived as having a disability).
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protection. 89 There is nothing inherently illogical in that policy
decision. 9 '
Presumably for these reasons, the need of the "class" is not often
cited in support of the argument that employment discrimination statutes
should protect individuals erroneously perceived to be disabled."9 ' The
focus instead is on the fact that discriminatory conduct should be

proscribed regardless of whether it is based on an accurate perception of
an individual's condition.192 The court in Sanchez v. Lagoudakis,193
for example, stated that "[i]f the employer acts on a belief that the
employee has a handicap,... it is inconsequential whether the employee
actually has the handicap because, in either hypothesis, the employer has
undertaken the kind of discriminatory action that the [law] prohibits."'9 4 There is considerable force to that argument, as the Sanchez
court went on to explain:

189. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. West Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 376 S.E.2d 154, 159 (W. Va.

1988).
190. See The City of Phoenix's Reply Brief on Cross-Appeal at 4-5, Burris v. City of Phoenix,
875 P.2d 1340 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (No. I CA-CV 90-545) [hereinafter Burris Reply]. The brief
states,
By omitting ... protection for individuals who are not truly handicapped, but only are
'perceived' as such, [a] Legislature could ... reasonably concludefl that the pressing
since those not
issue [is] to ensure that only the truly disabled [are] protected ....
actually handicapped but only perceived as such in certain situations could ordinarily
obtain employment elsewhere.

Id.
191. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 486 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Mich. 1992) (observing that the
proper focus in a perceived handicap case is on "the employer's conduct - the employer's belief
or intent - and not the employee's condition"); Rollins, supra note 16, at 646 (observing that "the
concept of perceived handicap requires a shift in focus from the individual's condition to the
[particular] employer's perception, attitude and state of mind").
192. See Bay City Fire Dep't v. Department of Civil Rights, 451 N.W.2d 533, 536 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989) (Reilly, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he employer's conduct is equally objectionable
in either case"); see also Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 591 P.2d 461, 465 (Wash. Ct. App.
1979) ("It makes no difference to the employee whether he is discharged because he, in fact, [is
handicapped] ... or that the employer perceives that he [is]. The employer has terminated the
employment for the same reason - a reason which constitutes discrimination contrary to the
provisions of the statute.").
193. 486 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. 1992).
194. Id. at 660; see also Chandler v. Schlumberger, 542 N.W.2d 310, 314 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995):
The purpose of the [statute at issue in Sanchez] is to prevent discrimination - a process
of thinking and conduct by the employer - based on handicap. . . . [I]t would be
inconsistent with that purpose to deny protection to those who are the victims of this
process even though the perception is erroneous that they are handicapped. The harm on
which the legislature focused is the same whether the object of the discrimination was
handicapped or not.
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The purpose of [handicap discrimination] act[s] is to prohibit employers

from discriminating on the basis of handicap.

It would not be

consistent with that purpose to relieve employers who so discriminate

of liability if, although they acted in a prohibited discriminatory
manner, it later turns out that their belief was in fact erroneous. The

key as far as the act is concerned is that the employer acted on the
belief of a handicap. 95

IV. STATUTORY ANALYSIS

Many who favor prohibiting perceived disability discrimination as
a matter of policy might nevertheless agree that as a matter of statutory
construction, some of the cases interpreting state statutes to provide such
protection have been decided incorrectly.'9 6 Perhaps the clearest
examples of this possibility are the Arizona Court of Appeals' decisions
in Burris v. City of Phoenix97 and Bogue v. Better-Bilt Aluminum

Co.1

98

Neither the statutory definition of "handicap" in effect at the time
Burris and Bogue were decided' 99 nor the applicable legislative history

195. Sanchez, 486 N.W.2d at 660 n.16. The court in Burris likewise noted that
[i]t would be an anomalous situation if discrimination in employment would be prohibited
against those who possess the handicap but would not include within the class a person
'perceived' by the employer to have the handicap, [because]
[p]rejudice in the sense of a judgment or opinion formed before the facts are known
is the fountainhead of discrimination engulfing medical disabilities which prove on
examination to be unrelated to job performance or to be nonexistent.
Burris v. City of Phoenix, 875 P.2d 1340, 1345 (quoting Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co.,
591 P.2d 461, 464-65 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (emphasis added)).
196. One disability rights advocate has acknowledged that less than half of the state disability
discrimination statutes in existence in the mid-1980's prohibited discrimination based on perceived
disabilities. Hoffman, supra note 11, at 20; see also Brief of Anicus Curiae The City of Bisbee at
10, Burris v. City of Phoenix, ,875 P.2d 1340 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (No. I CA-CV 90-545)
[hereinafter Burris Amicus Brief] (observing that "one need not disagree with the policy concerns
[favoring the prohibition of perceived disability discrimination] to recognize that... those concerns
fall within the province of the legislative, and not the judicial, branch"); cf. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 785 F.2d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that "[a]lthough we sympathize with
appellant's position.... it cannot support a claim of... discrimination solely on the basis of
defendant's perception"), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
197. 875 P.2d 1340 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
198. 875 P.2d 1327 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
199. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461.4 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
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of that provision appears to support the holdings in those cases.20 '
The Arizona legislature first amended the Arizona Civil Rights Act to
prohibit disability discrimination in 1985,202 well after the Rehabilitation Act20 3 had been amended to protect individuals who are regarded
as having an impairment .2 4 The purpose of the Rehabilitation Act
amendment was to "protectfl those persons who do not have a present or
past impairment, but are perceived by others as having an impairment."205 The Senate Report accompanying the amendment states:
[T]he new definition clarifies the intention to include those persons who
are discriminated against on the basis of handicap, whether or not they
are in fact handicapped, just as T]itle VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits discrimination on the ground of race, whether or not the
person discriminated against is in fact a member of a racial minority.
This subsection includes within the protection of [the Act] ... those
persons who do not in fact have the condition which they are perceived
as having, as well as those persons whose mental or physical condition
does not substantially limit their life activities .... Members of both
of these groups may be subjected to discrimination on the basis of their
being regarded as handicapped.20 6
When Arizona first considered amending the ACRA to prohibit

200. There actually is relatively little legislative history regarding the amendment of the ACRA
to provide protection for disabled individuals. See O'Connor, supra note 8, at 656 n.136; Burris
Reply at 6 n.6.
201. See, e.g., Bogue, 875 P.2d at 1334 (observing that while "many state anti-discrimination
laws specifically provide that it is an unfair employment practice to discriminate against an
individual because of a perceived handicap," there is "no explicit perceived handicap provision in
the ACRA"); O'Connor, supra note 8, at 655 (observing that the ACRA definition of handicap
"ma[de] no provision for... protecting ... those with a history of an impairment or regarded as
having an impairment").
202. See ARiz. LAWS, ch. 167.
203. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
204. Id. § 706(8)(B)(iii). The Rehabilitation Act originally defined a "handicapped individual"
as "any individual who (A) has a physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes
or results in a substantial handicap to employment and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in
terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation services .... " Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat.
357 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1988 & Supp. V 1994)). Congress expanded the
definition in 1974 to "preclude discrimination against [a] person who ., . is regarded as having an
impairment [but who] may... have no actual incapacity." School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273,279 (1987) (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,405-06

n.6 (1979)).
205. Gamble v. Levitz Furniture Co. of the Midwest, 759 P.2d 761,764 (Colo. App. 1988), cert.
denied en banc., 782 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1989).
206. S.REP. No. 1297,93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),reprintedin1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389-
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disability discrimination in 1982,207 the bill introduced in the Arizona
House of Representatives was to follow the amended federal definition
by including a person with a "physical impairment which substantially
limits one or more major life activities," as well as one who is "regarded
as having such an impairment," within the definition of "a handicapped
individual." 25 That effort failed20 9 because when Arizona subsequently amended the act in 1985 to prohibit discrimination on the basis
of disability,210 the provision protecting individuals who are regarded
as having an impairment was not included.2
The Arizona legislature's failure to adopt the Rehabilitation Act
definition is significant not only because states that permit recovery when
the employer discriminates against an individual because of a perceived
disability generally have statutory definitions of handicap similar to the
Rehabilitation Act definition,21 2 but also because the Arizona Court of
Appeals has stated that where the language of the Rehabilitation Act is
213
broader than that of the ACRA, Arizona does not follow federal law.
The fact that the Arizona legislature consciously rejected a bill patterned
after the Rehabilitation Act definition makes its failure to adopt that
definition even more significane 4 because the rejection of a legislative
amendment ordinarily "indicates that the ... legislature did not intend
[for the legislation]
to include the provisions embodied in the rejected
25
amendment.5 1
Similar reasoning prompted the West Virginia Supreme Court to
conclude that the adoption of a state statutory definition of handicap that

207. See H.B. 2440, 35th Leg., 2d Sess., 1982 ARiz. LAWS.

208. Passage taken from Arizona House Bill 2440.
209. See Burnis Reply at 6 n.6.
210. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463.

211. See Bogue, 875 P.2d at 1334; Burris Reply at 6 n.6.
212. See Turner v. City of Monroe, 634 So. 2d 981, 984 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
213. Bogue, 875 P.2d at 1332.
214. The Arizona legislature had followed the amended Rehabilitation Act definition elsewhere.
In a statute providing "handicapped persons" who apply for public employment with "preference
points" on merit examinations, the legislature defined a "handicapped person" as "anyone who has
a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities or has
a record of such impairment or is regarded as having such an impairment.... ." AIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 38-492.B (West 1985 & Supp. 1995).
215. MacDonald v. General Motors Corp., 784 F. Supp. 486, 498 (M.D. Tenn. 1992); see also
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. McKay, 769 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[lIt is well-settled

that the rejection of amendments offered in the course of enactment is often probative in ascertaining
legislative intent."). But cf.United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1184 (6th Cir.

1982) ("IT]he language of rejected alternative legislation is not entitled to great weight in construing
legislation that was finally passed, since the court has no way of knowing what motivated the
legislature to take such action.'), aff'd, 464 U.S. 165 (1984).
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was more restrictive than the Rehabilitation Act definition "after the
tripartite definition was added to the federal statute"2 16 reflected a
"legislative decision to restrict the protection against discrimination on

the basis of 'handicap' to those cases in which the discrimination was on
the basis of an actual, existing, physical or mental impairment., 217 The

Texas Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Chevron Corp. v.
Redmon,21' as did the Michigan Court of Appeals in Sanchez v.
clear why the Arizona Court of Appeals
Lagoudakis,219 and it is not
220
reached a different result.
The fact that Burnis and Bogue may have been decided incorrectly

is further illustrated by the Arizona legislature's decision to amend the
ACRA after those cases were decided to include within the definition of

"handicap" the condition of "[b]eing regarded as having a physical
impairment.,,22' There are two possible ways to interpret this amendment,M as represented by the conflicting decisions in Chico Dairy Co.
v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission223 and Sanchez v.
Lagoudakis.224
As noted earlierp the West Virginia legislature amended the
West Virginia Human Rights Ace2 6 to include within the act's protection individuals who are regarded as having an impairment 27 while
Chico Dairy Co. was pending on appeal. 8 The West Virginia Su-

216. Chico Dairy Co. v. West Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75, 84 (WK.Va. 1989)
(emphasis added).
217. Id. at 78 n.1 (emphasis omitted).
218. 745 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tex. 1987). In Ritchie v. City of Houston, No. CIV.A. H-87-504,
1988 WL 24676 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 1988), the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas relied upon Chevron Corp. to hold that an individual whose potential employer regarded
his history of lymphoma as a physical impairment substantially limiting his major life activities was
not protected by the Texas Human Rights Act even though he was protected under the Rehabilitation
Act.
219. 457 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 486 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. 1992).
220. See Bogue, 875 P.2d at 1332 (noting that "[wlhere the Rehabilitation Act is broader than
the ACRA, we do not follow the federal law").
221. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461.4(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995)).
222. See generally Bailey v. Menzie, 505 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (observing that
"an amendment adding a provision to a statute" may reflect the legislature's view that "the statute
as originally drafted did not contain the provision," or that the provision implicitly was, "in fact, a
part of the statute").
223. 382 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1989).
224. 486 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. 1992).
225. See supra part II and accompanying notes.
226. W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11-1. to 5-11-19. (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1995).
227. Id. § 5-11-3(t).
228. See Chico Dairy Co., 382 S.E.2d at 85 n.10.
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preme Court relied upon this "change" in the law as evidence that, prior
to the amendment, "the legislature had decided not to protect against the
mere perception of a handicap. '2 9
The Michigan Supreme Court, by contrast, relied upon a similar
amendment to the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act2 30 following the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision in Sanchez v.
Lagoudakis23' to reach precisely the opposite conclusion. 232 The
Michigan Supreme Court apparently concluded that the amendment
supported its interpretation of the pre-amendment version of the act
(which was silent as to perceived disabilities) 2 33 to prohibit discrimination against individuals erroneously perceived to be disabled.234
Given the legislative history of Arizona's statutory definition of
"handicap," the analysis in Chico Dairy Co., as opposed to Sanchez,
appears to be more appropriate for Arizona. 3 s The amendment to the
236
ACRA, by including perceived disabilities within the definition
following the Burris and Bogue decisions, 237 obviously reflects the fact
that, as constituted at the time of the amendment, the Arizona legislature
agreed with the result reached in those cases. 238 However, it is not
necessarily an indication that the legislature sitting at the time "handicap"
was originally defined held the same view. 239 In fact, the amendment

229. Id.; see also Fourco Glass Co. v. West Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 383 S.E.2d 64, 66 (W.
Va. 1989) ("Prior to the amendment, . .. the statute did not.., envision a 'perceived handicap' as
a 'handicap."').
230. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.1101-1607 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995).
231. 457 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd,486 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. 1992).
232. Sanchez, 486 N.W.2d at 662.
233. See id. at 660-62, 662 n.31.
234. Id. at 661.
235. See Burris Reply at 1-2 (discussing the similarity between Chico Dairy Co. and Burris).
236. See ARiz. REv. STAT. AN. § 41-1461(4) (Supp. 1995).
237. Cf American Motors v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 350 N.W.2d 120, 123 n.4 (Wis.
1984) (commenting that "[tihe legislative history... indicates that the legislature patterned the
statutory definition of 'handicapped individual' after the definitions of handicap that this court [has]
previously adopted."). One commentator has written,
In 1980 the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted the [Wisconsin Fair Employment] Act's
protection to include persons who were not actually handicapped but who were,
nonetheless, discriminated against because they were perceived as being handicapped.
One year later, the supreme court's definition of handicap was incorporated into the Act.
Rollins, supra note 16, at 639.
238. See generally Bailey v. Menzie, 505 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind. Ct. App, 1987) ("[An]
amendment may ...clarify that the [added] provision is, in fact, a part of the statute.'),
239. See Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 801 P.2d
357, 364 (Cal. 1990) ("The declaration of a later Legislature is of little weight in determining the
relevant intent of the Legislature that enacted the law."); cf Bailey, 505 N.E.2d at 128 ("[Tihe intent
we are searching for is that of the legislature that passed the original statute, not that of any
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may reflect recognition of the fact that the legislature as constituted at
the time "handicap" was first defined intended a different interpretation.240
The holdings in Burris and Bogue are undermined by yet another
recent amendment to the ACRA. 241 At the time Burris and Bogue
were decided, the act stated that individuals were not protected unless
they had informed the employer that they had an impairment or condition
that constituted a disability.242 The individual must also have informed
the employer of the nature of the disability and any limitations or restrictions resulting therefrom.243 Finally, the employer must have been
provided with the names of any health care practitioners who could
provide additional information relating to the nature of the disability and
its possible effects. 2 "
There is an obvious inconsistency in prohibiting individuals who fail
to advise their employers of their disabilities from claiming the protection
of the act while simultaneously interpreting it to provide protection if
their employers merely believe that they are disabled. 2' Among other
things, the analysis in Burris and Bogue could have led to a situation in
which an individual with no impairment was protected, while an
individual with an actual impairment was not protected simply because
the impairment was not disclosed to the employer.24 6
The Arizona Court of Appeals dealt with this anomaly by effectively
rewriting the statute." Because itislogically impossible for individuals who believe they do not have a disability to provide their employers
with the name of the doctor who treated the condition, the court in

subsequent legislature. To the extent that the amendment merely represents the opinion of the

amending legislature as to how the statute should be construed, it is not controlling.) (authority
omitted).
240. See generally Bailey, 505 N.E.2d at 128 ("One inference that may be drawn from an
amendment adding a provision to a statute is that, in the view of the legislature, the statute as

originally drafted did not contain the provision.").
241. See Arz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463.F.
242. ARmz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1463.F.5(a) (repealed 1994).
243. Id. § 41-1463.F.5(b) (1992) (repealed 1994).
244. Id. § 41-1463.F.5(c) (repealed 1994).
245. Burris Amicus Brief at 7 ("If... an individual could claim protection from discrimination
under the ACRA simply by claiming that the employer had 'perceived' him to be handicapped, the
disclosure requirements of [the act] would be rendered meaningless.").
246. Cf.Rollins, supra note 16, at 654 (referring to the "anomalous result of affording protection
to [an] individual who has no impairment, while denying the same protection to [an] individual who
has only a slight, but nonetheless actual, impairment').
247. See Bogue v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Co., 875 P.2d 1327, 1337-38 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994)

(rejecting a "literal" reading of the statute as an unreasonable "interpretation").
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Bogue held that despite its express language, the ACRA merely required

individuals seeking to claim its protection to have informed the employer
of their physical condition and, if applicable, any restrictions or

limitations that may affect their job performance.248
The Arizona legislature reacted to this strained interpretation of the
statute by repealing the provisions with which the Arizona Court of

Appeals had struggled. 249 The resulting amendment suggests that the
legislature recognized that the holdings in Burrisand Bogue could not be

reconciled with the language of the ACRA as it appeared when those
cases were decided.250
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ISSUE

At first blush, the issue of whether state employment discrimination
statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of perceived disabilities
appears to be largely academic 25' in light of Congress' enactment of
the ADA252 which specifically defines an individual with a disability to

include one who is regarded as having an impairment.253 However, the
issue in fact retains considerable vitality for a number of reasons. 2 4
First, similar to Title VII, 25" the ADA applies only to employers
with fifteen or more employees 256 while the employment discrimination

248. Id. at 1337-38.
249. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1463 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
250. See Burris Amicus Brief at 8 ("[T]he limitation on protection represented by the ACRA's
disclosure requirements is further evidence that the Arizona legislature did not intend to provide
protection for individuals who are merely perceived to be handicapped."); cf. Hunt v. Dark Hill
Enters., 867 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (legislature reacted to a "novel" judicial
interpretation of a statute by deleting the provision that had been interpreted); see generally Ohio
exrel. Sayre v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 245 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Ohio 1969) (observing that "the
rectification of linguistic slippage is generally a legislative function").
251. See, e.g., Capitano v. Arizona, 875 P.2d 832, 834 & n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that
"the trial court [had] disregarded the Arizona statute and found that [the plaintiff] had a 'disability'
under federal law" even though "the ADA... was not [yet] in effect at the time.").
252. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 329 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp.
V. 1994)).
253. Id. § 12102(2)(C).
254. See, e.g., Horton v. Delta Air Lines, 4 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 31, 34 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(considering the merits of a perceived disability claim under the ADA while dismissing similar
claims under a state fair employment statute because the state statute "d[id] not provide a basis for
the protection of individuals with 'perceived' disabilities"). The issue of whether state legislation
prohibits perceived disability discrimination has attracted specific academic attention in at least one
jurisdiction. See Rollins, supra note 16.
255. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
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statutes in a number of states do not exempt small employers from

coverage.257 Thus, an employer with fewer than fifteen employees who
discriminates against a person the employer erroneously perceives to be
disabled may be liable only if an applicable state statute prohibits such

discrimination. 2 8

For this reason, whether a state employment

discrimination statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of perceived
disabilities is likely to be an issue of considerable importance for many

small employers and their employees. 9
In addition, some states may recognize tort claims for wrongful

257. See Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n v. Travelers Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 1358, 1361 n.5 (Colo.
1988) ("Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies only to employers with 15 or
more employees.... no such limitation is found in [Colorado's antidiscrimination legislation] ...
(citations omitted). See generally Kems v. Bucklew, 362 S.E.2d 924, 925 n.2 (W. Va. 1987):
Title VII... defin[es] employers subject to its regulations as persons "who [have] fifteen
or more employees. . .." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). It is apparent, then, that a substantial
number of small businesses are beyond the reach of Title VII... due to ... the size of
their workforces. These businesses are, however, subject to state human rights acts, and
Congress intended such acts to retain their full vitality so as to regulate business practices
falling outside of [federal] protections.
Id.
258. Cf. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota, 289 N.W.2d 396, 401 (Minn. 1979)
("Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating... only if that employer has 15 or more
employees.... Only state legislation prohibits ... discrimination by employers of fewer than 15
employees.") (citations omitted).
259. The federal exemption for small employers appears to be based, at least in part, on a
Congressional decision to "protect small entities with limited resources from liability" for employment discrimination. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993). However,
the exemption also may be based upon a desire to "reliev[e] the administrative body of the burden
of enforcement where fewjob opportunities are available, and... keep[l the agency out of situations
in which discrimination is too subtle or too personal to make effective solutions possible." Robinson
v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 825 P.2d 767,774 (Cal. 1992). As one court has stated with
respect to a similar state statutory exemption:
A sense of justice and propriety led the framers to believe that individuals should be
allowed to retain some small measure of the so-called freedom to discriminate; besides,
they feared the political repercussions of eliminating totally an area of free choice whose
infringement had been so bitterly opposed. In the second place, the framers believed that
discrimination on a small scale would prove exceedingly difficult to detect and police.
Third, it was believed that an employment situation in which there were
[few] ... employees might involve a close personal relationship between employer and
employees and that fair employment laws should not apply where such a relationship
existed. Finally, the framers were interested primarily in attacking protracted, large-scale
discrimination by important employers and strong unions. Their aim was not so much
to redress each discrete instance of individual discrimination as to eliminate the egregious
and continued discriminatory practices of economically powerful organizations. Thus
they could afford to exempt the small employer.
Id. at 775 (quoting Michael C. Tobriner, CaliforniaFEPC, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 333, 342 (1965)).
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discharge 26° based upon
the public policy expressed in a state disability
26

discrimination statute, but not upon public policies underlying federal
2611
legislation such as the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA.262 Individuals
in those states may assert a common law wrongful discharge claim

260. Although the term "wrongful discharge" occasionally is given a broader connotation, see,
e.g., Ronald Weisenberger, Note, RemediesforEmployer's Wrongful Dischargeof an Employeefrom
Employment of an Indefinite Duration, 21 IND. L. REv. 547, 566 n. 116 (1988) ("'Wrongful
discharge' refers to any discharge for which the employer is or may be liable."), in the present
context the term refers to a common law cause of action, usually sounding in tort, premised upon
the "public policy" exception to the employment at will rule. See, e.g., Woerth v. City of Flagstaff,
808 P.2d 297, 303 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 467 &
n.2 (Md. Ct. App. 1981). The exception permits an employee to recover when a discharge violates
"some important public policy," Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1031
(Ariz. 1985), typically reflected in legislation, administrative rules and regulations, or judicial
decisions. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980).
261. See, e.g., Katzer v. Baldor Elec. Co., 969 F.2d 935, 937-39 (10th Cir. 1992) (recognizing
a common law wrongful discharge claim premised upon the public policy against disability discrimination expressed in Oklahoma's anti-discrimination statutes); Kelley v. City of Mesa, 873 F. Supp.
320, 327 (D. Ariz. 1994) (holding that a wrongful discharge claim can be premised upon the public
policy prohibiting disability discrimination reflected in the Arizona Civil Rights Act); Horton v.
Delta Air Lines, 4 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 31, 34 (N.D. Cal 1993) ("Plaintiff's ADA claim, [California Fair
Employment and Housing Act] disability claim, and ... her public policy claim all allege that
defendant discriminated against her on the basis of actual or perceived disabilities."). However, the
weight of authority appears to be to the contrary. See, e.g., Kramer v. St. Louis Regional Health
Care Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1317, 1318-19 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (common law wrongful discharge claim
based on public policy against disability discrimination was barred by the remedial provisions of the
Missouri Human Rights Act); Gamble v. Levitz Furniture Co. of the Midwest, 759 P.2d 761, 766
(Colo. App. 1988), cert. denied, 782 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1989) (state statutory remedy for disability
discrimination precluded employee's claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy);
Northrup v. Farmland Indus. Inc., 372 N.W.2d 193, 196-97 (Iowa 1985) (wrongful discharge claim
premised on the public policy exception was barred by the availability of state statutory remedies
for disability discrimination). See generally Kimberly C. Simmons, Annotation, Pre-emption of
Wrongful Discharge Cause ofAction by Civil Rights Laws, 21 A.L.R. 5th 1, 23 (1994) (observing
- incorrectly - that the courts are "unanimous" in holding that "common-law actions brought to
redress discharge because of discrimination against illness and disability are pre-empted by relevant
state and federal antidiscrimination laws").
262. See Kramer, 758 F. Supp. at 18-19 (holding wrongful discharge claim barred by the
availability of remedies under the Rehabilitation Act); Fergerstrom v. Datapoint Corp., 680 F. Supp,
1456, 1458 n.2 (D. Haw. 1988) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act preempted a state law wrongful
discharge claim premised upon a public policy against disability discrimination). See generally
McCarthy v. Cycare Sys., Inc., 2 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 680, 683 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (concluding
that "contravention of a public policy set forth in federal law does not support a state claim for
wrongful discharge"); Pratt v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 500 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (III. App. Ct. 1986)
("The common theme of our courts' decisions sustaining a plaintiff's cause of action for [wrongful]
discharge is there must be a State public policy at issue.... [E]xclusively Federal concerns cannot
support [such] a State common law remedy ... "), leave to appeal denied, 506 N.E.2d 959 (III.
1987); Victoria W. Shelton, Note, Will the Public Policy Exception to the Employment-at-Will
DoctrineEver Be Clear?-Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 14 CAMPBELL L. REv. 123, 131 (1991)
(arguing that "the courts have left open the question whether violations of federal public policy can
form the basis for a wrongful discharge action in state courts ....
").
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discrimination only if a state statute
premised upon perceived disability
63
prohibits such discrimination.
One advantage of the common law claim is that individuals
asserting it may not be required to exhaust the administrative procedures
that often are a prerequisite to bringing suit directly under the applicable
statute.264 In states that do not recognize wrongful discharge claims
based upon federal public policies, 265 victims of perceived disability
discrimination must invoke the administrative mechanism set forth in the
ADA prior to bringing suit unless there exists a state statute prohibiting such discrimination upon which the common law claim can be
based.267
This issue also has a significant impact upon the potential remedies

263. See, e.g., Horton, 4 A.D. Cas. (BNA) at 34 ("Since [the California Fair Employment and
Housing Act] does not provide a basis for the protection of individuals with 'perceived' disabilities,
plaintiff's claim... that defendant violated the public policy against discrimination of individuals
with perceived disabilities [is] ...dismissed.") (capitalization omitted). But cf Kelley, 873 F. Supp.
at 327 (holding that a person can bring a claim for wrongful discharge based on the public policy
against disability discrimination embodied in the Arizona Civil Rights Act even though she may not
fit "exactly into one of the protected categories recognized in the statute").
264. See, e.g., Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 387 (Cal. 1990) ("[A]lthough an employee must
exhaust the ... administrative remedy before bringing suit on a cause of action under the act or
seeking the relief provided therein, exhaustion is not required before filing a civil action for damages
alleging nonstatutory causes of action.'); Leibert v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 65, 72
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that "the rationale of the [wrongful discharge] claim would be
undermined if a violation of a fundamental public policy of the state had to remain unredressed
simply because a plaintiff failed to pursue nonexclusive administrative remedies").
265. Some courts have recognized tort claims for wrongful discharge based on public policies
reflected in federal statutes. See, e.g., D'Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 628 A.2d 305, 312
(NJ. 1993) ("[T]his Court and other courts .. . have found a wrongful-discharge cause of action
when based on a clearly-articulated federal policy."); Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1283
(Utah 1992) ("A number of state courts... have recognized that certain federal laws may properly
form the basis for a wrongful termination action under a state's public policy exception."); Makovi
v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 561 A.2d 179, 188 (Md. 1989) ("[C]lear public policy under federal as
well as [state] ...law can supply the basis for an abusive discharge action ....").
266. The ADA requires individuals claiming to have been discriminated against to pursue
administrative relief prior to bringing suit. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 12117(a). "[Als a condition
precedent to filing suit, an ADA plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies." Dutton v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 2 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1214, 1215 (D. Kan. 1993) (citations omitted).
267. In addition, in some states common law wrongful discharge claims premised upon the
public policy reflected in an employment discrimination statute apparently can be maintained against
small employers who are exempt from liability directly under the statute. See, e.g., Kerrigan v.
Magnum Entertainment, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D. Md. 1992) ("[T]he Court finds that
[a] ...wrongful termination claim based on alleged discrimination will lie ...for claimants whose
former employers employ fewer than [15] persons."). But cf.Jennings v. Marralle, 876 P.2d 1074,
1083 (Cal. 1994) ("It would be unreasonable to expect [small] employers who are expressly
exempted from the [statutory] ban on... discrimination to nonetheless realize that they must comply
with the law from which they are exempted under pain of possible tort liability.").
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available to the plaintiff.2 6 If a victim of perceived disability discrimination must rely upon the ADA, then the only remedies available are
those specified in the act itself, which "caps" the amount of compensatory and punitive damages to which the plaintiff may be entitled based
upon the size of the employer.2 69 If, on the other hand, the plaintiff
can assert a common law claim for wrongful discharge premised upon a
public policy against perceived disability discrimination reflected in a
state statute, tort damages generally will be available and, at least
theoretically, unlimited.27 °
Finally, many plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases elect to
bring their claims in state court, while employers generally prefer that
such cases be tried in the federal courts.271 Whether a plaintiff claiming to have been discriminated against on the basis of a perceived
disability can assure that the claim is heard in state court is dependent
upon whether the claim can be asserted under state law, or instead must
be based on a federal statute such as the ADA.272 For those individu-

268. The principal basis for some courts' recognition of tort claims for wrongful discharge is
the view that statutory remedies for employment discrimination "may, at times, prove to be inadequate." Broomfield v. Lundell, 767 P.2d 697, 705 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); see also Holien v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1303 (Or. 1984) (concluding that common law remedies should be
available because statutory remedies often "fail to capture the personal nature of the injury done to
a wrongfully discharged employe [sic].").
269. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(2), (b)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
270. See, e.g., Niblo v. Parr Mfg., 445 N.W.2d 351,355 (Iowa 1989) ("In considering the cause
of action for wrongful discharge, we believe that damages caused by mental distress may properly
be considered in addition to the lost earnings caused by the termination of employment."); Clanton
v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441,445 (Tenn. 1984) (stating that "[elourts recognizing a cause of
action for [wrongful] discharge have permitted the recovery of punitive damages').
271. See David M. Lester, A Preemptive Strike: Removing Wrongful Discharge Claims to
FederalCourtBased Upon DamageAllegations, 5 LAB. LAW. 641, 641 (1989) ("While plaintiffs'
attorneys prefer to bring [wrongful termination] actions in state court ... , defense attorneys.., prefer that cases be tried in federal courts."); Mark R. Kramer, Comment, The Role of
FederalCourts in ChangingState Law: The Employment at Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania,133 U.
PA. L. REV. 227, 261 (1984) ("Whenever possible, [wrongful discharge] defendants will remove to
a federal forum, because the substantive law there is friendlier to employers.'); Michael B. Thornton,
Note, Intimations of FederalRemoval Jurisdiction in Labor Cases: The Pleadings Nexus, 1981
DUKE L.J. 743, 747 (observing that "strategic advantages are likely to motivate the defendant to seek
removal").
272. Although the state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over ADA claims, see
Jones v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 859 F. Supp. 1144, 1145 (N.D. Il1. 1994); Lillback v. Metro Life
Ins. Co., 640 N.E.2d 250, 258 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994), an employer sued in state court under the ADA
has the right to remove the case to federal court. Barraclough v. ADP Automotive Claims Servs.,
Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1310, 1311-12 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Eakin v. Magic Tilt Trailers, 2 A.D. Cas. (BNA)
649, 650 (E.D. La. 1993). See generally Jones, 859 F. Supp. at 1145 ("[T]he existence
of... concurrent jurisdiction does not alter the fact that ADA actions are federal-question cases.").
State statutory discrimination claims (and common law wrongful discharge claims premised on state
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als as well, whether a state employment discrimination statute prohibits
perceived disability discrimination is an issue of considerable importance.273
VI.

CONCLUSION

As a matter of policy, individuals erroneously perceived to be

disabled should ordinarily fall within the protection of statutes prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of disability.2 74 Because employers forced

to pay for their discriminatory actions are likely to alter their future
behavior,275 imposing liability for perceived disability discrimination
would provide greater deterrence of discriminatory employer conduct,276 which is obviously one of the primary purposes of disability

antidiscrimination statutes), on the other hand, generally cannot be removed on federal question
grounds. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1171 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[A] wrongful
discharge claim is not one that arises under federal law... and is hence not removable on that
basis.'; Korb v. Raytheon, 707 F. Supp. 63, 70 n.6 (D. Mass. 1989) (expressing tentative agreement
with the view that "a claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, without more, does not invoke
federal question jurisdiction no matter what the context"). See generally Gully v. First Nat'l Bank
in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 116 (1936) ("By unimpeachable authority, a suit brought upon a state
statute does not arise under an act of Congress or the Constitution of the United States... "3273. In Horton v. Delta Air Lines, 4 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 31, 34 (N.D. Cal. 1993), for example, the
court concluded that a victim of perceived disability discrimination could recover only under the
ADA, and not under a state employment discrimination statute or on a common law theory premised
upon the public policy embodied in the state statue. A plaintiff pursuing an ADA claim in state
court in accordance with that decision could not prevent the employer from removing the case to
federal court. See Barraclough,818 F. Supp. at 1311-12; Eakin, 2 A.D. Cas. (BNA) at 650; Jones,
859 F. Supp. at 1145.
274. "[P]ublic policy can clearly be served by adopting [the] interpretation that the prohibition
against discrimination because of handicap necessarily includes a proscription against discrimination
based on a 'perceived' handicap ... since the purpose of [such legislation] is to make consideration
of an individual's handicap irrelevant to an employer's decisionmaking processes." BriefofAmicus
Curiae National Coalition for Cancer Survivorship at 14, Burris v. City of Phoenix, 875 P.2d 1340
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 1 CA-CV 90-545).
[T]he legislative emphasis on the removal of artificial barriers, on the elimination of
stereotypical assumptions about identified groups, and on requiring employers to focus
on qualifications rather than categories is the pervasive theme running through federal and
[state] anti-discrimination legislation.... [The] argument that [an employer] should not
be held liable for discriminating against individuals whom it perceives to be handicapped ... is simply another way of saying that stereotypes or beliefs about the abilities
of individuals ... may, in certain circumstances, be substituted for consideration of
individual qualifications when employment decisions are made.

Id. at 11-12.
275. See Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F. Supp. 769, 786 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
276. See Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 486 N.W.2d 657, 660 n.16 (Mich. 1992) ("It would not be

consistent with [the] purpose [of disability discrimination legislation] to relieve employers
who ... discriminate of liability if, although they acted in a prohibited discriminatory manner, it
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discrimination legislation.277
However, precisely who should constitute the class protected by

disability discrimination legislation is ultimately a policy question for
legislative resolution. 2" A legislature considering that issue would
presumably balance the arguments in favor of extending protection to
persons erroneously perceived to be disabled against the social cost of
employer compliance 279 and the increase in litigation that inevitably

would accompany that result.280 Such a legislature might strike that
balance in favor of denying protection to individuals incorrectly
perceived to be disabled.281
Thus, where an employment discrimination statute has no explicit
perceived disability provision,2" courts should not lightly assume that

the legislature intended to attack discrimination with greater force than
is suggested by the statutory language. 283 The intrinsic appeal of
employment discrimination laws may create pressure for constantly
expanding protections that occasionally requires a measure of direction

later turns out that their belief was in fact erroneous.").
277. See Misek-Falkoff v. IBM, 854 F. Supp. 215, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
278. See Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 457 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) ("We offer no
comment on the policy arguments. . . favoring application of the act to situations involving
perceived handicaps as we believe such arguments are best made to, and decided by, the
legislature."), rev'd, 486 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. 1992); Chico Dairy Co. v. West Va. Human Rights
Comm'n, 382 S.E.2d 75, 85 n.10 (W. Va. 1989) ("Mhe legislature... decided not to protect
against the mere perception of a handicap; we do not, of course, address the wisdom of the
legislature's decision in this regard.'); Rollins, supra note 16, at 644 ("[T]he legal definition of
handicap is a political construct. It reflects the blend of medical and social considerations upon
which public policy decisions, such as eligibility for entitlements or protection from discrimination,
are based.") (citations omitted).
279. See generally O'Connor, supra note 8, at 634 n.10 (discussing the costs involved in
"assuring equal access to handicapped persons"). But cf.Hoffman, supra note 11, at 22 (arguing
that the social costs of proposed disability discrimination legislation are "far outweighed by the
benefits of maximizing the employability of all work-capable individuals, whether handicapped or
erroneously perceived as handicapped').
280. See Bun-is Reply at 5 n.5 ("One obvious factor any legislature may consider in setting the
limits of protection under a statute is the extent to which litigation will result based on the
definitions [it] choose[s] to utilize.'); 137 CONG. REc. S15,479 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement
of Sen. Bumpers) ("jIThe job of the [legislature] is to craft legislation on civil rights that is strong
enough to dissuade people from discriminating against their employees on the basis
of... disability.., but not so liberal that it literally promotes litigation. That is a very delicate
balance to achieve."); see generallyThomas P. Owens III, Note, Employment at Will in Alaska: The
Question of Public Policy Torts, 6 ALAsKA L. REv. 269, 306 (1989) (discussing the "significant
increase in [employment] litigation that inevitably accompanies the broadening of recovery
theories.").
281. See supra part II and accompanying notes.
282. See Bogue v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Co., 875 P.2d 1327, 1334 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
283. See Lowry v. Clark, 843 F. Supp. 228, 231 (E.D. Ky. 1994).
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and control.2" Courts mindful of that phenomenon should be hesitant
to expand liability beyond that supported by the statutory language absent
28 5
compelling reasons for doing so.

284. See Cunningham v. Central Beverage, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 59, 62 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
285. See generally Lowry, 843 F. Supp. at 231:
A mere showing that a plaintiff may be without a ... remedy... cannot support imposing ... liability if the statute does not create such liability ....
Although the purpose
of [a statute] ... admittedly [may be] ... to eradicate employment discrimination, a
court may not expand liability ... merely to meet that purpose in the absence of a
[legislative] ... directive.
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